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ON COPYRIGHT AND SCIENTIFIC THEORY 
Thomas M. Byron† 
At present, intellectual property law offers extremely limited 
possibilities for protecting a scientific theory in its most basic form, 
including fundamental hypotheses, rule-based relations, mathematical 
equations, models, and diagrams. Regardless of the current state of 
intellectual property law, this Article is willing to entertain a 
hypothesis of its own—that scientific theory could be a proper subject 
of copyright protection. In two discussion sections, the Article defends 
both sides of the debate. One side of the debate argues in favor of 
copyright protection for scientific theories, showing that scientific 
theory represents an intellectual creation of the scientist, not a mere 
statement of uncopyrightable fact. A scientific theory offers substantial 
flexibility and openness in its creation due to the presence of near-
infinite theories that could have been chosen instead of any given 
theoretical equivalent. If a scientific theory satisfies the current 
requirements for copyrightability, then there is no reason not to grant 
it protection. The other side of the debate advocates the opposite 
point—that copyright should not protect scientific theory—and bases 
this argument on science’s ever-progressing nature and its community 
standards that favor free access to the work of other scientists. That 
side also opposes the presence of sufficient legal creativity to merit 
copyright protection of a scientific theory. To structure the arguments 
presented in the two primary sections, this Article relies heavily on the 
philosophy of the early-twentieth-century physicist and scientific 
historian Pierre Duhem. After an investigation of both the strengths 
and limitations of Duhem’s theories, the Article concludes by weighing 
the merits of the two arguments proposed.     
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INTRODUCTION 
It is close to black letter law that scientific theory1—at least in its 
sparest form of models, basic hypotheses, and equations—is not 
eligible for any meaningful intellectual property protection. The point 
can be made in a brief regime-by-regime review of intellectual 
property’s current domains of protection. Let us begin with patents: 
Patent law makes a general distinction between unapplied and 
applied science, wherein only the latter receives protection. It was in 
this vein that the Supreme Court interpreted the Patent Act in Diamond 
v. Chakrabarty, noting that: 
[t]he laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas 
have been held not patentable. Thus, a new mineral 
discovered in the earth or a new plant found in the wild is not 
patentable subject matter. Likewise, Einstein could not patent 
his celebrated law that E = mc2; nor could Newton have 
patented the law of gravity. Such discoveries are 
‘manifestations of . . . nature, free to all men and reserved 
exclusively to none.’2  
If scientific laws and the equations and models simulating them are not 
patentable, this is because patent law’s protections require more than 
scientific theory’s observation and modeling of reality as it 
(purportedly) is. The Court in Diamond went on to hold that the 
microorganism at issue in the case was patentable because, unlike the 
																																								 																				
 1. For purposes of this Article, scientific theory may be defined as a series of hypotheses, 
rule-based relations, mathematical equations, diagrams, and models that are capable of being 
tested and intended to serve a predictive function with respect to empirical reality. The theories 
discussed here may be comprised of numeric, symbolic, or linguistic components, but any non-
numeric, non-symbolic aspects of the theory are assumed to be expressed as briefly and 
economically as possible—in other words, we are concerned here with the potential of providing 
intellectual property protection for the statement, “For every action, there is an equal and opposite 
reaction,” as opposed to the question of whether Newton’s Principia would be copyrightable as a 
whole (if written today). ISAAC NEWTON, PRINCIPIA, at 86 (Daniel Adee ed., Andrew Motte trans., 
1846) (1687). 
 2. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (citations omitted).  
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natural laws just mentioned, it reflected “a non-naturally occurring 
manufacture or composition of matter—a product of human 
ingenuity.”3 Patentable subject matter is inventive, the stuff of an active 
human intervention to bend phenomena, both natural and man-made, 
to human use.4 “Use” is the right term, because one of the requirements 
for the issuance of a patent is the “utility” of the potentially patentable 
material.5 Where automobiles, washers, and computer systems offer 
certain evident forms of utility that make their subparts potentially 
patentable, the person attracted to Earth by the planet’s gravitational 
pull can be much less said to be “using” the effect of that law in any 
meaningful, intentional way. In view of the utility requirement and the 
Diamond dicta, the scientist receiving a patent must do more than just 
passively observe and record nature for future theoretical predictions; 
she must actively tinker with nature to serve the end of non-obvious 
human utility.6    
Trademark protection is even more obviously unavailing for the 
discoverer of a scientific law or theory. As trademark protection is 
																																								 																				
 3. Id. at 309-10.  
 4. Morton v. N.Y. Eye Infirmary, 17 F. Cas. 879, 881 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1862) (No. 9,865) 
(“In its naked ordinary sense, a discovery is not patentable. A discovery of a new principle, force, 
or law operating, or which can be made to operate, on matter, will not entitle the discoverer to a 
patent. It is only where the explorer has gone beyond the mere domain of discovery, and has laid 
hold of the new principle, force, or law, and connected it with some particular medium or 
mechanical contrivance by which, or through which, it acts on the material world, that he can 
secure the exclusive control of it under the patent laws. He then controls his discovery through 
the means by which he has brought it into practical action, or their equivalent, and only through 
them. It is then an invention, although it embraces a discovery. Sever the force or principle 
discovered from the means or mechanism through which he has brought it into the domain of 
invention, and it immediately falls out of that domain and eludes his grasp. It is then a naked 
discovery, and not an invention.”). 
 5. Arti Kaur Rai, Regulating Scientific Research: Intellectual Property Rights and the 
Norms of Science, 94 NW. L. REV. 77, 106 (1999) (discussing the utility requirement in the context 
of gene sequences and noting that such sequences would not be patentable until their utility was 
determined).   
 6. Isaac Asimov’s short story, The Billiard Ball, provides a good example of the 
distinction between patentable applied science and unpatentable theoretical science. In that story, 
the scientist Priss develops a strictly theoretical basis for an electromagnetically-driven anti-
gravity field that would eliminate the effects of ambient gravity to create a zero-gravity state. His 
rival Bloom, renowned for his applications of Priss’ theories, uses this theory to invent a zero-g 
machine. The story does not fail to mention that Bloom was careful to patent his applications of 
Priss’ theories (and then exploit those inventions for his own financial gain). Priss’ work, 
meanwhile, would have been ineligible for patent protection. The story comes to a head when 
Priss is provided the opportunity to make the first use of Bloom’s machine by sending a billiard 
ball into it. ISAAC ASIMOV, The Billiard Ball, in THE BEST OF ISAAC ASIMOV (Fawcett Crest 
1973). In theory, Bloom as patent holder and Priss as simple scientist is how patent law would 
mete out its monopolistic rewards. But there remains an interesting legal fiction—what should 
patent law do with something that changes natural law? If Newton could not have patented gravity 
hypothetically, could someone patent a never-before-observed modification of a natural law, like 
“anti-gravity,” distinct from a machine to implement it? 
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limited to goods and services in commerce,7 its purview could not 
conceivably cover a newly-discovered scientific law. Extending 
trademark protection this far would amount to declaring that “genetics” 
is a good or service of Mendel, or that “gravity” was brought to the 
public by Newton. Obviously, this is not the case. Neither of these 
examples is a good or service in commerce; and even if natural laws 
were somehow commoditized for commercial use, they would not owe 
their origin to their discoverer or exploiter. The very idea of scientific 
discovery is that something—e.g., a mechanical relation, a magnetic 
attraction—pre-dated the discovery and continues to exist in the wake 
of the discovery.8 Discovered or not, the scientific relation remains in 
effect to the same extent. “Relativity” might be proper as a word mark 
in trademark law, just not as attached to the scientific theory that 
Einstein proposed.  
Copyright is similarly unfavorable to scientific theories, at least 
in their barest form. Section 102(b) of the Copyright Act clarifies that 
copyright protection does not “extend to any idea, procedure, process, 
system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, 
regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, 
or embodied in such work.”9 A scientific theory could easily be 
classified as an idea, a system, a concept, a principle, or a discovery, 
and denied protection on that basis.  
At a more fundamental level of copyright law, section 102(b) 
derives much of its substance from the idea-expression dichotomy, 
which dictates that abstract ideas are not copyrightable, while the 
specific expression embodied in a work is. While there is no good way 
to distinguish an unprotected “idea” from a protected “expression,”10 
the general spirit of the idea-expression dichotomy is to prevent 
copyright protection from monopolizing necessary building blocks of 
expression like words, stock elements, and high-level concepts. We 
would not want to grant a monopoly on the idea of an absurdist story 
																																								 																				
 7. See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2012), which defines a trademark to include “any word, name, 
symbol, or device, or any combination thereof— 
(1) used by a person, or 
(2) which a person has a bona fide intention to use in commerce and applies to register 
on the principal register established by this chapter,  
to identify and distinguish his or her goods, including a unique product, from those manufactured 
or sold by others and to indicate the source of the goods, even if that source is unknown.” Id. 
 8. This should not be misinterpreted to mean that what is discovered or posited in a 
scientific theory is the exact thing that pre-existed the theory. As shall be seen later, scientific 
discoveries may reasonably be viewed as created facts, to a certain extent.  
 9. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2012).  
 10. Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930) (“Nobody has 
ever been able to fix that boundary, and nobody ever can.”). 
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about an oversized protagonist, lest Jarry’s Ubu have blocked Ken 
Toole’s A Confederacy of Dunces.11 Similar logic would seem to 
dictate that the discoverer of a theory like gravity or relativity would 
not be able to own the discovered theory so that others may use that 
theory, alter it, and test it without running afoul of intellectual property 
protections. And indeed, this is the case, at least for expressions of a 
theory in its barest form of high-level statements, basic equations, 
models, and diagrams. Copyright would only attach to a scientific 
theory in an expanded explanation of the theory—Einstein, for 
instance, wrote a book on relativity,12 which certainly merits copyright 
protection generally. Yet a copyright in a work expansively describing 
a theory would only apply to lengthy descriptions of the theory in 
words, and not the theory’s underlying equations, ideas, hypotheses, or 
models themselves.   
The only possible exception to intellectual property’s lack of 
protection for scientific theories is trade secret protection. The typical 
formulation of material eligible for trade secret protection is any 
information that provides a competitive advantage in the marketplace 
by virtue of its being kept secret.13 A business could conceivably 
discover a scientific theory and then keep it secret for its own personal 
gain. Practically speaking, however, this is probably a rare scenario. 
Consider, for example, Steven Goldberg’s comment:  
It is rare for a scientific discovery to immediately lead to a 
new device. More often it takes a chain of scientific 
discoveries and engineering advances to bring a product to 
fruition. Indeed, although inventions may in theory always 
rely on some underlying scientific principle, many inventors 
have little or no knowledge of scientific theory and rely 
instead on their own intuitive ideas about improving previous 
inventions. Numerous studies, including those related to 
sophisticated post-World War II military inventions, show 
that many inventions are based primarily on earlier 
technology rather than on science.14  
																																								 																				
11.  ALFRED JARRY, UBU ROI (Paul Negri & Drew Silver eds., Beverly Keith & Gershon 
Legman trans., Dover Publications 2003) (1896); JOHN KENNEDY TOOLE, A CONFEDERACY OF 
DUNCES (Louisiana St. Univ. Press 1980). 
 12. See generally ALBERT EINSTEIN, RELATIVITY: THE SPECIAL & GENERAL THEORY, 
(Robert W. Lawson trans., Princeton Univ. Press 2015) (1915). 
 13. Eric Johnson, Trade Secret Subject Matter, 33 HAMLINE L. REV. 545, 546 (2010). 
Johnson also notes other more restrictive definitions of trade secrets in Part II, but even those 
definitions would likely cover scientific theories discovered by a business. See id. 
 14. Steven Goldberg, The Reluctant Embrace: Law and Science in America, 75 GEO. L. J. 
1341, 1344 (1987).  
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While undoubtedly there are certain commercial entities engaged in 
basic research, Goldberg points toward a more common division of 
labor between theoretical and applied science, such that those who care 
most about trade secrets are those least likely to have a new scientific 
theory to protect.15 And even if a business did discover a theory and 
subsequently apply trade secret protection to it, that scenario would not 
prevent others from independently discovering the theory16—in which 
case, the business would have no recourse against the later discoverer.     
All of which would generally leave scientific theory, at least in 
the form of models, diagrams, and equations, squarely in the public 
domain. This seems like a reasonable state of affairs, at least in view of 
certain basic principles of the sociology of science. According to 
Merton’s oft-cited research, science’s aim of extending knowledge is 
served by four key values: universalism, communism, 
disinterestedness, and organized skepticism.17  
The second value, which prizes communal ownership of the fruits 
of scientific discovery,18 would seem anathema to the application of 
intellectual property rights to basic theories. Lest concerns remain that 
a lack of such proprietary rights erode incentives to conduct basic 
theoretical research, scientific culture has established its own set of 
alternative incentives supporting such research, including rewards, 
honors, career advancement, and the intrinsic satisfaction of making a 
meaningful discovery.19 Further, science’s accretive nature—one 
might think here of the line often misattributed to Newton that he saw 
farther because he stood on the shoulders of giants20—militates in favor 
of a broader commons whereby scientists may take advantage of the 
fundamental research of their predecessors without the transaction 
costs associated with intellectual property licensing.  
Is it really inconceivable, however, to imagine a world where 
basic science might be protected by proprietary rights? In the first half 
of the twentieth century, numerous regimes for the proprietary 
protection of basic science were proposed in Europe.21 The rationale 
																																								 																				
 15. Id. 
 16. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 43 (AM. LAW INST. 
1995) (“Independent discovery and analysis of publicly available products or information are not 
improper means of acquisition.”). 
 17. Peter Drahos, Intellectual Property Law and Basic Science: Extinguishing 
Prometheus?, 10 LAW IN CONTEXT 56, 67 (1992). Dan Burk also includes “originality” on the list 
as a fifth member. Dan Burk, Research Misconduct: Deviance, Due Process, and the 
Disestablishment of Science, 3 GEO. MASON INDEP. L. REV. 305, 310 (1995).  
 18. Drahos, supra note 17. 
 19. Id. at 69.  
 20. The line likely owes its origin to Bernard de Chartres.  
 21. See generally Thomas R. Ilosvay, Scientific Property, 2 AM. J. COMP. L. 178 (1953).  
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behind such proposals was the failure of the then-current incentive 
system to promote fundamental scientific research.22 While that 
incentive system may have evolved substantially in the near century 
since such proposals initially appeared, concerns over equitable 
remuneration for scientific discovery may still be well placed. If the 
discovery and development of a basic scientific theory were to lead 
directly, via a separate commercial entity’s basic application of the 
theory, to a very popular product (a hypothetical that is not so far-
fetched), then perhaps the possibility of winning an award or receiving 
other forms of recognition does not sufficiently protect the scientist 
making the original discovery. That was precisely the problem at the 
heart of the rivalry in Isaac Asimov’s The Billiard Ball—the applied 
scientist made all the money while the theoretical scientist whose work 
underpinned the applied scientist’s remained relegated to relative 
obscurity.23  
In view of this problematic scenario, let us offer the remainder of 
this article as its own sort of scientific theory, or perhaps put more 
correctly, meta-scientific theory. We shall begin with a hypothesis, test 
it through a series of arguments, and try to reach a conclusion based on 
the results of the arguments. The hypothesis initially in question? 
Scientific theories are a proper subject of intellectual property 
protection.  
Yet this hypothesis can be refined even further in view of the 
limits of current regimes of intellectual property protection. Attempting 
to accommodate protection of scientific theories within trademark law 
would be a fool’s errand—non-commercial natural phenomena are 
conceptually too distinct from the commercial confusion and dilution 
protected by trademark law to suggest a meaningful bridge to that gap. 
Trade secret, while potentially offering a modicum of protection to the 
private discovery of a scientific theory, is very likely to be time-limited, 
particularly if the scientific theory is just waiting to be discovered by a 
different party.24 And either way, if the hypothesis aims to test long-
																																								 																				
 22. Id. at 179 (“But seldom does [the scientist] receive equitable remuneration for his 
services. The concept of scientific property contemplates legal protection of the scientist's 
interests by recognizing that he has a right to an appropriate award on account of the industrial 
application of his scientific discovery or theoretical invention.”). 
 23. ASIMOV, supra note 6. 
 24. It is assumed here that a sufficient number of potential discoverers exists such that 
some combination of scientific norms promoting publication of discoveries and an eroded value 
in keeping a given theory secret will lead to public disclosure of the theory. At worst, the secret 
would become a secret de Polichinelle. Practically speaking, however, this may not be the case. 
For example, very few people have both access to, and knowledge of, something as sophisticated 
as the Large Hadron Collider at CERN. If CERN were a private entity, that entity could choose 
not to share its findings with little risk of those theories alternatively being discovered. See 
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term protection for publicly circulating theories, then trade secret is 
simply inapposite.  
These initial refinements in the hypothesis leave patents and 
copyrights as potential anchoring points for the intellectual property 
protection of scientific theory. Yet patents also seem to be a 
questionable choice. As already mentioned, patent protections require 
utility—something hard to imagine in the case of a scientific theory in 
the absence of a step applying the theory. So, patent law would need to 
be rewritten for this one-off case.  
Patents present additional complications when considered in 
connection with scientific theories. One is infringement—if Newton 
had been able to patent gravity, what would it mean to “practice” 
gravity such that one infringed Newton? It might mean using the 
equations underlying the theory, in which case all scientists working 
with Newton’s theory might potentially infringe the theory. It might 
even mean to make use of gravity, in which case Newton would have 
enjoyed a twenty-year monopoly over keeping all humans planted on 
Earth. Somewhat related to this reductio ad absurdum is the 
woodenness of patent law in its protections. Professor Peter Lee has 
spoken of the importance of intellectual property in making a 
distinction between unprotectable “infrastructure” and protectable 
“application.”25 Scientific theories currently fall on the side of 
infrastructure—free for use by anyone who wishes to apply them in 
their own work (and potentially, to receive intellectual protection in 
such applications of the theoretical infrastructure).  
While copyright and trademark laws feature certain exceptions 
that maintain a robust infrastructure—like fair use, the idea/expression 
dichotomy, and genericide—patent law is less flexible.26 Patent holders 
effectively can block the practice of their patents for the twenty-year 
life of a patent.27 This situation would be especially problematic in the 
case of patents on scientific theories because such theories are more 
likely to be upstream of further inventions applying them. So, any 
patent holder in a scientific theory would have potentially much greater 
																																								 																				
Drahos, supra note 17, at 64 (“At the same time, the cost of industry r&d [sic] has continued to 
rise. The cost of major science facilities, like particle accelerators, which most countries see as 
essential to maintaining a high technology capability, amount to billions of dollars. Obtaining 
scientific truth is now a multi-billion dollar enterprise.” (citations omitted)). 
 25. See generally Peter Lee, The Evolution of Intellectual Infrastructure, 83 WASH. L. REV. 
39 (2008). 
 26. Id. at 45. 
 27. Id. at 41. Technically, patent law does have an exception to infringement liability for 
“experimental use,” but that exception is limited to “strictly philosophical purposes that have no 
commercial application.” Rai, supra note 5, at 139. It is not clear that even that exception would 
overcome patent blocking in the hypothetical space of non-applied science.  
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influence when enforcing that patent than an inventor simply protecting 
a patented invention. Instead of the one-to-one comparison between 
patented invention and potentially infringing device, the scientific 
theory patent might preempt a broad range of unrelated fields and 
applications using the theory (and thereby stifling innovation). 
Accordingly, patent law seems ill-suited as a protective regime for 
scientific theory.  
That leaves copyright.28 With due respect to commentators who 
believe that copyright deals “with the arts and [has] no obvious 
relevance to science at all,”29 that view misconceives the fluidity that 
exists between the aesthetic and artistic, on one hand, and the utilitarian 
and scientific, on the other. Marcel Duchamp’s ready-mades were little 
more than utilitarian objects transplanted directly into the world of art. 
Emile Zola’s Roman Expérimental project described how the 
novelist—more particularly, the naturalist novelist—could reduce the 
act of writing a novel to the experimental method of the physician 
Claude Bernard.30 The latter, it should be recalled, viewed 
experimental science as leading to a form of absolute certainty, where 
certain initial conditions in the human body could be shown to lead to 
corresponding, and correspondingly certain, pathological outcomes.31  
Literature for Zola and science for Bernard were, at least in Zola’s 
view, one in the same. Meanwhile, as we shall see in more detail later,32 
the arrow directing science into the space of art is bidirectional—
artistic and aesthetic tendencies are also capable of informing the 
process of scientific discovery, which cannot reasonably be reduced to 
so many dry, un-copyrightable facts. Once there are forms of 
mechanical literature and aesthetic science, then the simple binary 
categorization between science and art loses its probative force.  
Perhaps in recognition of this fluidity, copyright has developed to 
protect more than just traditionally artistic and aesthetic works. 
																																								 																				
 28. Technically, theories might also be granted sui generis protection, the likes of which 
have already been granted for vessel hulls and semiconductor designs. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 1301-32 
(2012); 17 U.S.C. §§ 901-14. However, in the interest of working with an established body of law 
featuring certain helpful doctrines like fair use, copyright will be the subject of the hypothesis 
here. Sui generis protection for scientific theories could serve as the basis for a different article 
under a different hypothesis. Appropriately so, for as we shall see a little later, science is a space 
where hypotheses abound.   
 29. Drahos, supra note 17, at 58.  
 30. See generally EMILE ZOLA, LE ROMAN EXPÉRIMENTAL (G. Charpentier ed., 2d ed. 
1880), http://bit.do/Zola_Le-Roman-Experimental.  
 31. See generally CLAUDE BERNARD, INTRODUCTION À L’ÉTUDE DE LA MÉDECINE 
EXPÉRIMENTALE, (Paris, Bailliére et Fils 1865), http://bit.do/Bernard_LEtude-Medecine-
Experimentale.  
 32. See infra notes 90-108 and accompanying text. 
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Copyright has been found sufficiently broad to protect dryer content 
like used car prices,33 forms compiling baseball statistics,34 and 
computer software.35 Because of a variety of limits built into copyright 
law (of which are not present in patent law), granting protection to 
these classes of more functional works is not particularly problematic 
as a matter of the scope of monopoly. Thanks to the idea-expression 
dichotomy, a specific set of used car prices might be copyrightable if 
they reflect the price author’s judgment; but the act of setting used car 
prices, with or without judgment, is not copyrightable. Others may then 
seek their own copyright prices through their own separate acts of 
judgment. Similarly, the application of copyright theory to a selected 
set of statistics in a specific form does not foreclose use of any of the 
individual statistics within that form, or the compilation of another 
form using a different set of statistics. Due to the restrictions in section 
102(b), software copyright protection does not extend to the 
functionality of the program, just the expression of that functionality.36 
And in each case, the mere user of the copyrighted work will not 
infringe the original without exercising any of the rights protected by 
the Copyright Act.37 In other words, if the consumer of the used car 
prices, stats sheet, or software, merely uses the copyrighted artifact 
without copying, distributing, modifying, or displaying that artifact, 
then the use is not within the ambit of the Copyright Act.  
All of these limits commend copyright as a candidate for the 
potential intellectual property protection of scientific theories. Much as 
copyright protects computer code that contains dry content intended to 
support functionality by protecting only the expression of that 
functionality, so too might a scientific theory be properly viewed as a 
form of expression worthy of protection in the observation and 
prediction of a particular phenomenon. That expression might be 
viewed as protectable without reaching the underlying idea of the 
theory. Further, unlike patent law whose protections would 
hypothetically impact the use of natural laws if such laws were 
patentable, copyright’s limited set of rights would not impact a mere 
user of the scientific theory protected by copyright (presuming no other 
protected rights were implicated in the user’s activity). Copyright 
offers the further attribute of fair use, which would allow many 
applications of protected scientific theory without requiring the license 
																																								 																				
 33. CCC Info. Serv. v. Maclean Hunter Mkt. Reports, Inc., 44 F.3d 61, 67 (2d Cir. 1994).  
 34. Kregos v. Associated Press, Inc., 937 F.2d 700, 704-05 (2d Cir. 1991).  
 35. Apple Comput., Inc. v. Franklin Comput. Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1249 (3d Cir. 1983).   
 36. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b). 
 37. See 17 U.S.C. § 106.  
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necessary in a patent-blocking situation. So, let us update the 
hypothesis proposed for the scientific experiment (or meta-experiment) 
proposed here: Scientific theory is the proper subject of copyright 
protection.  
To test this theory, this Article will rely in no small part on the 
epistemology and philosophy of science of Pierre Duhem. Who was 
Duhem? He was something of a modern Renaissance man in the world 
of science.38 During Duhem’s lifetime (1861-1916),39 theoretical 
science witnessed massive upheaval, upheaval in which he 
participated, if on the “losing” team.  
With the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries came the 
growth of Darwin’s evolutionary biology, James Clerk Maxwell’s 
electro-magnetism, Clausius and thermodynamics, Boltzmann’s 
statistical mechanics, the adoption of atomic theory, and, of course, the 
arrival of relativity via Einstein. Lost in the shuffle of these now-
textbook fields of scientific study is the domain of energetics. Often 
associated with the work of Wilhelm Ostwald,40 energetics proposed 
the study of the flow and transformation of energy. Duhem’s work 
supplemented Ostwald’s; to this day, the Gibbs-Duhem equation—
measuring the amount of free energy in a system based on its volume 
and temperature—still bears his name.  
Despite his contributions to theoretical science, Duhem picked the 
wrong theory to support. Because of energetics’ focus on what moves 
between objects, it came to serve as an antithesis to atomic theory’s 
object-oriented approach.41 With proof of the existence of atoms in the 
																																								 																				
 38. Pierre Humbert estimates Duhem’s talent worthy of a professorial chair at the Sorbonne 
(a chair that he never achieved, instead remaining in Bordeaux for much of his career). PIERRE 
HUMBERT, LES MAÎTRES D’UNE GÉNÉRATION, PIERRE DUHEM 16 (Paris, Librairie Bloud et Gay 
1932), http://bit.do/Les-Maitres-dune-Generation. To demonstrate the scope of Duhem’s talents, 
one need look no further than the titles of Humbert’s chapters in his biography of Duhem—“[t]he 
man,” “[t]he physicist,” “[t]he philosopher,” “[t]he historian,” and “[t]he master.” Stanley Jaki 
refers to Duhem as “a giant of the intellect.” STANLEY L. JAKI, SCIENTIST AND CATHOLIC: PIERRE 
DUHEM 17 (Christendom Press 1991).  
 39. HUMBERT, supra note 38, at 9-10. 
 40. A good description of the debate between Ostwald’s energetics and Boltzmann’s 
mechanics is available, see, for example, ÉTIENNE KLEIN, LE FACTEUR TEMPS NE SONNE JAMAIS 
DEUX FOIS (Éditions Flammarion 2007).  
 41. HUMBERT, supra note 38, at 56; see, e.g., PIERRE DUHEM, L’ÉVOLUTION DE LA 
MÉCANIQUE (J. Vrin 2000) (1903) translated in PIERRE DUHEM, THE EVOLUTION OF MECHANICS 
(G. Æ. Oravas ed., Michael Cole trans., Sijthoff & Noordhoff International Publishers 1980). 
Duhem’s 1903 book details, among other things, his view of the conflict between atomically-
focused theory and his preferred non-atomic view. Id. at 87-88. Where theory based on the 
presumption of the existence of atoms (then not proven to exist, it should be noted) required 
somewhat strained calculations that sacrificed precision in Duhem’s view, Lagrangian mechanics, 
based only on the relation between artificial parts of a system (though not necessarily atoms), 
offered a better means of understanding that system. Id. 
12 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J.  [Vol. 34 
early-twentieth century, energetics was largely discarded, relegated to 
a footnote in the annals of science along with constructs like 
phlogiston42 and ether.43 Despite the gradual rejection of energetics, 
which had already begun during Duhem’s life, he always considered 
himself a scientist first and foremost—he even went so far as to reject 
an academic promotion that would move him from Bordeaux to Paris 
because the position was not for a physicist, but for a historian of 
science.44  
Yet it was in this latter field that Duhem made some of his most 
notable contributions. Much of his work concerned the period between 
ancient Greek science and Galileo—a period comprised, in large part, 
of the Middle Ages. Duhem’s arduous research into this supposedly 
fallow period for science tended to show that rather than present a 
lacuna between the Romans and the Renaissance, the science of the 
Middle Ages contributed directly to the developments of the 
Renaissance.45 Specifically, Galileo’s discoveries followed from an 
unbroken chain of scientific thought dating at least back to 1200 AD.46 
At the time of his passing, Duhem was in the process of expanding his 
historical work into what was intended to become a twelve-volume 
encyclopedia of the history of science from Plato to Copernicus.47 As 
if that weren’t enough, beyond the practice of theoretical science and 
its history, Duhem’s work even reached the domains of epistemology 
and the philosophy of science. This Article will rely on many notions 
familiar to Duhemian philosophy of science in constructing its 
arguments for and against copyright protection in scientific theory.  
It bears note here why the philosophy of science generally, and 
Duhem’s philosophy of science, more specifically, serve to structure 
the polemic presented here. To answer the first question, inflecting the 
philosophy of science to address questions of how law should treat 
																																								 																				
 42. Phlogiston was the substance proposed to explain combustibility. THOMAS S. KUHN, 
THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (Otto Neurath, Rudolf Carnap, & Charles Morris 
eds., Univ. of Chicago Press, 2d ed. 2012) (discussing at length its ultimate failure as a scientific 
construct). 
 43. Ether, like phlogiston, was a fictitious scientific creation inserted in pre-Relativity 
models to explain certain deviations from Newton’s theory in the behavior of light. See, e.g., 
PIERRE DUHEM, LA THÉORIE PHYSIQUE: SON OBJET, SA STRUCTURE 29-30 (J. Vrin 2007) (1906) 
translated in PIERRE DUHEM, THE AIM AND STRUCTURE OF PHYSICAL THEORY (Philip P. Wiener 
trans., Princeton Univ. Press 1954) [hereinafter DUHEM, LA THÉORIE PHYSIQUE]. 
 44. HUMBERT, supra note 38, at 17-18.  
 45. Id. at 89.  
 46. Id.  
 47. See 1 PIERRE DUHEM, LE SYSTÈME DU MONDE: HISTOIRE DES DOCTRINES 
COSMOLOGIQUES DE PLATON À COPERNIC (A. Hermann 1913) and subsequent volumes, of which 
seven volumes had appeared in print at the time of Humbert’s biography. HUMBERT, supra note 
38, at 106. 
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science adds an additional, authentic dimension beyond basic policy 
concerns more internal to the law itself. Recalling Timothy Terrell’s 
Flatlaw article, law as a “Flatlaw” system may be viewed as a two-
dimensional, self-contained space of internal rules.48 Yet that space 
might also be transcended, where law’s two dimensions serve as a sub-
component of a three-dimensional space—a reflection of “larger social 
phenomena” guiding the law from the exterior.49 Terrell lists 
“community standards of morality and justice, economic efficiency, 
group behavior,” and “social and political forces”50 as examples of 
phenomena that might add a transcendent dimension to the study of 
law. Here, it is proposed that the philosophy of science furnish a further 
transcendent dimension by which to consider the legal protections of 
science from outside the law itself. And a particularly authentic 
dimension at that, as the philosophy of science normally does for 
science, what the larger social phenomena mentioned by Terrell can do 
for the law—they place a domain in contact with itself through a form 
of external circuitry or added dimensionality. What the philosophy of 
science can do for science itself, it might just as well do for the law of 
science—at least we will work from that assumption.  
But why Duhem’s philosophy of science, in particular? Duhem, 
of course, is not the only philosopher of science, and any number of 
other such philosophies could serve equally well, if in very different 
ways,51 when held up to the possibility of protecting a scientific theory 
through copyright law. Some of these possibilities will be presented in 
any event, but Duhem’s theory represents a reasonable spine both due 
to its generality and due to a few critical ways in which his view of 
science reflects a way of thinking currently applicable to copyright law. 
Additionally, where Duhem’s theories run into conceptual trouble—as 
we shall see—is precisely where the application of copyright to 
scientific theory runs into trouble. So even though Duhem was not a 
copyright scholar, or even a legal theorist or a lawyer, his theories are 
particularly well-suited to address questions of copyright law in the 
space of science.   
																																								 																				
 48. Timothy P. Terrell, Flatlaw: An Essay on the Dimensions of Legal Reasoning and the 
Development of Fundamental Normative Principles, 72 CAL. L. REV. 288 (1984). 
 49. Id. at 303-04.  
 50. Id. at 304.  
 51. To name a few possibilities, one could also rely on the mechanistic philosophy of 
science of a La Mettrie or a Jacques Monod, a theologically-inspired, deductive method à la 
Descartes, the theory of “personal knowledge” of Polanyi, the doctrine of falsifiability of Karl 
Popper, the more anarchistic scientific theory of Feyerabend, or the vitalism of Lamarck, Bergson, 
or Bichat.  
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This Article was undertaken with no preconceived conclusion, in 
the spirit of the scientific value of “disinterestedness” proposed by 
Merton.52 It will test the hypothesis that copyright law might protect 
scientific theory openly, by marshalling evidence for both sides of the 
debate. This certainly could be organized as a dialogue in the nature of 
Galileo’s Dialogo sopra i due massimi sistemi, with an updated form 
of Salviati, in favor of changing copyright law to protect scientific 
theory, conversing with a more conservative Simplicio in favor of 
keeping the laws as they are. Yet that might be a bit hard to follow, 
with a certain layering of circularity preventing meaningful conclusion. 
Instead, Part II of the Article will present the case for protecting 
scientific theory under copyright law. Part III will present the case 
against such protection. In both cases, the arguments will remain 
mostly restricted to the philosophy of science, with limited forays into 
the sociology of science. Rather than rely on empirically unsupported 
assertions the likes of “scientific research is currently adequately 
incentivized” or “scientific research is not properly incentivized”—the 
philosophy of science will provide a more concrete structure whereby 
such direct, unsupported contradictions may be at least partially 
avoided. Part IV will offer a conclusion based on the merits of the 
arguments in Parts II and III. In that way, the hypothesis offered here 
will be subject to rigorous testing and experimentation to see if it 
should be accepted as a theoretical possibility, or on the other hand, if 
it should be set aside like another energetics or phlogiston.  
I.  AN ARGUMENT TO PROTECT SCIENTIFIC THEORY UNDER 
COPYRIGHT LAW  
When attempting to determine the utility of a scientific theory, the 
traditional distinction between realism and rationalism is of central 
importance.53 According to realism, a scientific theory—or any other 
fact, for that matter—represents an objective truth, a truth that preexists 
specific human perception and remains exterior to human perception 
even having been perceived.54 The scientific fact, model, or theory is 
not merely a subjective construction; it is reality. The scientist 
operating in a realist framework does not create the models that she 
proposes; she merely reveals a relation that was there prior to the 
																																								 																				
 52. Drahos, supra note 17. 
 53. GASTON BACHELARD, LE NOUVEL ESPRIT SCIENTIFIQUE 5-6 (Les Presses 
Universitaires de France 2013) (1934). 
 54. BRUNO LATOUR & STEVE WOOLGAR, LABORATORY LIFE: THE CONSTRUCTION OF 
SCIENTIFIC FACTS 180 (Princeton Univ. Press 1986) (1979). 
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discovery.55 According to rationalism, by contrast, scientific theory is 
a creation of the human mind—an artificial and subjective intermediary 
used by humans to subject the ever-distinct outside world to more 
rigorous organization or classification. The fact or scientific model is 
not merely revealed in rationalism; it is created by a series of social 
actors and forces.56 Where realism is the province of an empirical 
worldview that presumes potential contact with the foundations of the 
reality observed, rationalism favors a more theoretically-motivated 
approach that applies a gloss of human creation to what is observed.57 
Of course, when the two doctrines are considered in close interplay, 
each can be viewed as wrapping around the other. For realism to 
envelop rationalism, one need only view the supposedly rational 
creation of the human mind as immediately integrated into an ever-
growing reality. For rationalism to envelop realism, one need only treat 
the supposedly real laws discovered by direct contact with reality as a 
creation of the mind.58    
Despite the apparent insolubility in the dichotomy separating—or 
perhaps incomprehensibly muddling—rationalism and realism, the 
former seems the better-supported approach by which to view modern 
scientific research and theory. The sociologist Bruno Latour explains 
the rationalism built into just such research, but then subtly evacuated 
in the ultimate scientific theory. Such is the outcome of a process of 
division and inversion.59 At the outset of a new scientific project—one 
seeking a new molecule, for example—a number of hypotheses may 
be proposed regarding the structure and composition of the 
undiscovered molecule. As the molecule’s structure is discovered with 
a greater degree of certainty, the hypothesis that ends up successfully 
reflecting that structure assumes a sort of double meaning—on the one 
hand, as a mere description in words signifying the newly discovered 
molecule, and on the other, as the actual molecule itself.60 With the 
molecule’s newfound reality, the first of these two meanings 
increasingly splits off and is discarded in favor of the second.61 
Meanwhile, the temporal orientation of the process of scientific 
discovery undergoes an artificial inversion. Where that process 
originally posited the molecule as an artificial pre-condition of 
																																								 																				
 55. Id. at 178.  
 56. Id.  
 57. BACHELARD, supra note 53, at 13 (discussing how neither one nor the other is an 
appropriate theoretical perspective for the entirety of physical theory). 
 58. Id. at 6 (suggesting these doubled constructions).  
 59. LATOUR & WOOLGAR, supra note 54, at 181. 
 60. Id. at 180. 
 61. Id.  
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research, the ultimately discovered molecule seems to provide a post 
hoc justification for the original hypothesis, such that the discovered 
molecule can be treated as having always existed. This leads to the 
realist’s tautology whereby the nature of external objects can only be 
described by the words chosen to constitute them.62 A rationalist view 
that conceives of such words as a construction or layer artificially 
added to reality better describes the products of theoretical science. As 
a final point in favor of rationalism, a realist viewpoint is hard to square 
with the nature of science, which François Jacob qualified as “partial” 
and “temporary.”63 If scientific theory ever reflected reality in its 
fullness, the theory achieving such perfection would never be replaced. 
Yet as scientific discovery from ancient Greece until the present has 
repeatedly shown, no scientific construct intended to reflect reality has 
achieved anything more than a temporary hegemony over other 
theories and a close approximation in its predictive calculations.   
Pierre Duhem reaches a similar outcome via a slightly different 
approach. One of his earliest points in La Théorie Physique, Son Objet, 
Sa Structure is to question what a physical theory really is. A theory 
might be defined in one of two ways—either as an explanation of the 
reality that it models or as a summary of that same reality.64 The 
explanation/summary dichotomy in many ways maps isomorphically 
to the rationalist/realist dichotomy. Theory as explanation would be 
akin to realism, in that the physical theory aspires to explain reality as 
it is, right down to the final causes that account for attractive or 
repulsive forces. Theory as mere summary is more rationalist in its 
reserve, as a summary theory only aspires to predict the mathematical 
parameters of the relations between objects. Newton’s theory of gravity 
provides a good example of this conflict, and its creator’s ostensible 
belief that his theory was merely a summary.65 Newton’s equations 
provided a highly-effective model to predict the mechanical motion of 
various objects in space, such that the freefall of an initially still 
cannonball from a tower to the ground could be predicted with a high 
degree of accuracy. Yet that set of mathematical relations does not 
justify more far-reaching hypotheses as to why the cannonball falls as 
it does.66 To take this additional step, Duhem argues, is to render a 
physical theory subordinate to a metaphysical system,67 which, in turn, 
																																								 																				
 62. Id. at 183.  
 63. FRANÇOIS JACOB, LE JEU DES POSSIBLES : ESSAI SUR LA DIVERSITÉ DU VIVANT 11 
(1981) (« partiel » and « provisoire » are his words). 
 64. DUHEM, LA THÉORIE PHYSIQUE, supra note 43, at 27. 
 65. Id. at 80-81.  
 66. Id. at 81.  
 67. Id. at 31.  
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renders that explanatory physical theory inconsistent with other 
explanatory physical theories subordinate to different metaphysical 
systems inconsistent with the original’s.68 Asking why of a physical 
theory via hypothesis introduces the further risk of injecting occult 
qualities into science.69 For example, when the seventeenth-century 
Cartesian philosopher Malebranche considered the phenomenon of 
billiard balls striking each other, he did not limit his theory to a simple 
model of the direction and magnitude of the balls’ movement on the 
table, he saw the striking of the ball’s as a means of carrying out the 
will of the divine agent governing the balls.70 A step like 
Malebranche’s might lead to a clearer notion of reality under his 
metaphysical system, but it exceeds the rationalist charge of physics as 
conceived by Duhem. As he notes, “A physical theory is not an 
explanation. It is a system of mathematical propositions, deduced from 
a small number of principles, which have the goal of representing as 
simply, as completely, and as exactly as possible, a group of 
experimental laws.”71 
This rupture between scientific theory as explanatory hypothesis 
and scientific theory as mere mathematical summary tracks a 
dichotomy that Duhem explored in depth in his book Sauver les 
apparences.72 The dichotomy in question divides the scientific role of 
the “astronomer” from the role of the “physicist.” The task of the 
astronomer is merely to construct a model that simulates the external 
world as completely and accurately as possible based on the external 
appearances of what is being modeled.73 The astronomer does not pose 
deeper metaphysical questions of a scientific theory, and will accept it 
as sufficient if it accurately predicts, for example, the location of a star 
or the behavior of weights on a lever. The physicist, by contrast, is 
concerned with deeper metaphysical questions.74 This concern 
translates to a requirement to select among a series of equally 
supportable hypotheses to determine which best suits a given 
																																								 																				
 68. Id. at 36.  
 69. Id. at 38-39. 
 70. NICOLAS MALEBRANCHE, DE LA RECHERCHE DE LA VÉRITÉ, at 447 (J. Vrin 2006) 
translated in NICOLAS MALEBRANCHE, THE SEARCH AFTER TRUTH, at 448 (Thomas M. Lennon 
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metaphysical system.75 So for the astronomer, the distinction between 
equally likely hypotheses is no great matter; for the physicist, it is all 
that matters.76 In his historical trace of the astronomer/physicist 
dichotomy from the time of Aristotle until the sixteenth century, 
Duhem concludes with a reproach of Kepler and Galilee,77 who 
abandoned the astronomer’s reserve in favor of a physician’s 
metaphysics. For Duhem, scientific theory is merely the model and the 
associated set of mathematical equations, not the hypothesis or set of 
hypotheses that inform it.  
Indeed, scientific theory viewed as mere mathematical summary 
creates a divergence between the theory’s content and the hypotheses 
informing it. On each side of the balance, a certain degree of freedom 
necessarily remains. Along the lines of what we have seen, Duhem 
notes that  
more often, physical theory cannot attain [a high] degree of 
perfection; it cannot offer itself as a certain explanation of 
perceptible appearances; the reality that it proclaims to reside 
beneath these appearances it cannot make accessible to our 
senses; it must make do with proving that all of our 
perceptions are produced as if reality was what the law 
affirms; such a theory is a hypothetical explanation.78 
Yet no hypothetical explanation exists to the certain exclusion of all 
others.79 Hypotheses may form the basis for a theory, but they need 
only be logically consistent when taken together.80 So if one wishes to 
hypothesize, as Malebranche did, that a divine force propagates 
movement among billiard balls, that hypothesis is acceptable as one 
way of imagining that mechanical interaction. Others, however, might 
view other hypothetical causes at work which are equally valid, 
because equally unprovable. This fluidity, and potentially infinite 
growth, in hypothetical systems flows from Duhem’s proposition that 
there is no such thing as an experimentum crucis.81 The latter, it may 
be recalled, is a logical construction by which hypotheses may be tested 
experimentally and winnowed serially by a sort of process of 
elimination. If, for example, there were but two possible hypotheses for 
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a given phenomenon—Duhem provides light as either a particle or a 
wave as an example of two such hypotheses82—then one experiment 
designed to distinguish between the two hypotheses would lead to the 
certain rejection of one and the acceptance of the other. What the 
proponent of the experimentum crucis forgets, however, is that 
hypotheses three, four, five, and so on are also equally possible and 
have not been tested. The near-infinite overgrowth of hypotheses 
possible for a given phenomenon is not amenable to much metaphorical 
trimming either, as any experiment produces its own internal, 
insurmountable complexities. Such complexities flow from the number 
of conditions needed to control a phenomenon experimentally, the 
remarkable edifice of theory implied by a given experiment, the tooling 
relied upon for experimentation, and other sources of error that remain 
inevitable. Hypotheses grow with alacrity, in Duhem’s view, and 
shrink with hesitation.  
The same may be said of mathematical models. There remains an 
irresolvable difference between empirically-observed facts and the 
mathematical equations used to model them.83 In that difference 
resides a good bit of mobility in translation between a practical fact and 
its theoretical representation. A single observed fact may thereby fan 
out into an “infinity” of theoretical representations.84 The mathematical 
equations and associated theoretical constructions are not a mere one-
to-one proposition with respect to reality; they are open to infinite 
variation and permutation. So, both hypotheses and mathematical 
models typically offer a freedom in construction that goes well beyond 
the often-singular set of equations presented for a given theory. If 
Newton had been inclined to hypothesize,85 an infinite number of 
hypotheses might have explained gravity. And if he had wanted to alter 
his mathematical model, an infinite number of additional equations 
might have effectively served the same mathematical end.  
The notable exception in Duhem’s theory to science’s realm of 
endless possibilities is what he calls la classification naturelle,86 the 
natural classification. The natural classification is a point of passage by 
which a theory becomes more than a mere arbitrary layer of 
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 83. Id. at 191.  
 84. Id. at 192. See also DUHEM, supra note 41, at 50 (highlighting that when one attempts 
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 86. DUHEM, LA THÉORIE PHYSIQUE, supra note 43, at 50. 
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mathematical laws and hypotheses placed between reality and the 
scientific observer. Without going so far as to explain the fundamental 
reality of the phenomena modeled, a theory touching on the natural 
classification achieves a reflection of the “real affinities” at play in 
those very phenomena.87 Again, science does not satisfy the realist’s 
ambitions via a natural classification—Duhem is still careful to use the 
word “image”88 to describe even the most perfected theories. Yet it 
does asymptotically seem to reach an evanescent point of contact 
joining the logical and the ontological.89 In view of this ethereal 
perfection, it is not surprising that natural classifications do not come 
around particularly often. Duhem reserves the designation for only 
those theories that have achieved a high degree of perfection in their 
predictive function and often, a high degree of aesthetic beauty in their 
articulation.90   
With a sufficient background in Duhem’s philosophy of science 
in tow, we can now return to the hypothesis proposed here—that the 
models, equations, and hypotheses of a scientific theory might be 
worthy of copyright protection. To merit copyright protection, a work 
must qualify as “original” within the meaning of the Copyright Act. 
“Originality” is comprised of two elements: (1) original creation by the 
author or creator of the work, and (2) evidence of a modicum of 
creativity in the work.91 Each of these requirements merits attention 
when considering the potential copyrightability of scientific theory.  
As to the originality of creation of a scientific theory, the 
discussion of the distinction between rationalism and realism has 
tended to demonstrate that a scientific theory is not merely the product 
of nature or a set of dry facts. Were it simply the scientist’s job to reveal 
the inner workings of nature in its theoretical form, then the resulting 
theory would scarcely qualify as original to the scientist; it would be 
original to the external universe being studied. As the Supreme Court 
has noted,  
It is this bedrock principle of copyright that mandates the 
law's seemingly disparate treatment of facts and factual 
compilations. No one may claim originality as to facts. This 
is because facts do not owe their origin to an act of authorship. 
The distinction is one between creation and discovery: the 
first person to find and report a particular fact has not created 
the fact; he or she has merely discovered its existence. To 
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borrow from Burrow-Giles, one who discovers a fact is not its 
“maker” or “originator.”92  
Scientific discoveries, however, are not simple facts. As Latour 
explained, the development and experimentation that lead to a new 
scientific fact or theory are not simply a process of revelation or 
discovery, but of creation.93 The scientist, by a trick of inversion, may 
ultimately lead colleagues and the consuming public to believe that a 
given theory is reality; yet this is an incorrect way of couching the 
theory. Minus this artificial inversion, scientific theory is revealed for 
what it really is—something that did not exist prior to the scientist’s 
creation of it. Duhem’s philosophy would reach a similar conclusion 
via the distinction between scientific theory as summary and scientific 
theory as explanation. As the proper ambit of theory is a summary in 
Duhem’s view, theory can never achieve the pure reflection of reality 
that would reduce it to mere fact. Indeed, scientific theory is neither 
true nor false in the manner of a common-sense fact;94 it is merely an 
approximation,95 one of many possible summaries of a given natural 
phenomenon. So, in view of either a Latourian or Duhemian 
perspective, the first of the two requirements of originality under the 
Copyright Act seems satisfied here.  
That leaves the question of creativity, and once again, the view of 
scientific theory as proposed by Duhem would seem capable of 
evidencing just such creativity. By almost any measure that a court 
might use when determining the presence of creativity in a work, a 
scientific theory might potentially merit copyright protection as 
creative. One might first consider the case originating the creativity 
standard in copyright, Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone 
Service Co. In that case, the Supreme Court considered the 
copyrightability of the traditional white pages of a phone directory,96 
and ultimately denied copyright protection to the phone directory 
because it was not sufficiently creative.97 Although the Court was not 
particularly clear in what actually did qualify as sufficiently “creative,” 
it did leave a few clues here and there in its opinion. On the one hand, 
the Court set a very low bar for the creativity necessary to merit 
copyright protection—a “modicum”98 of creativity would suffice. It 
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further clarified, “the requisite level of creativity is extremely low; 
even a slight amount will suffice. The vast majority of works make the 
grade quite easily, as they possess some creative spark, no matter how 
crude, humble or obvious it might be.”99 Yet the Court found the white 
pages at issue to be entirely “garden-variety”100 and “devoid of even 
the slightest trace of creativity.”101 What qualifies as “creative” may 
not be very clear, yet it is clear that very little creativity is necessary to 
satisfy this standard, and that only the most rote and obvious works—
like a strictly alphabetical listing of names and their phone numbers—
will fail to evidence sufficient creativity.  
If the Court’s language in Feist is generally vague and 
tautological, lower courts have attempted to provide precision as to 
what creativity might mean in the context of copyright law. The Federal 
Circuit’s recent decision in Oracle America, Inc. v. Google Inc.,102 
represents one common approach to creativity, by looking to the 
presence of sufficient alternative forms of expression for a given idea. 
As the court noted when considering the copyrightability of Oracle’s 
Java language, “copyrightability is focused on the choices available to 
the plaintiff at the time the computer program was created.”103 
Similarly, Google’s Android operating system could be found 
infringing of the copyrightable Java language because, among other 
reasons, “Google could have structured Android differently and could 
have chosen different ways to express and implement the functionality 
that it copied.”104 The Second Circuit in Matthew Bender & Co. v. West 
Publishing Co.,105 offered a similar view as to copyrightable creativity, 
“when it comes to the selection or arrangement of information, 
creativity inheres in making non-obvious choices from among more 
than a few options.”106 Still other courts have relied on similar 
reasoning when determining a work’s copyrightability.107 So thus far, 
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creativity appears to require both an element of authorial selection or 
judgment by a work’s creator, and the presence of sufficient alternative 
expressive alternatives available to the creator making such a selection 
in view of the work’s unprotectable idea.  
The creation of a scientific theory is capable of satisfying each of 
these elements under Duhem’s philosophy. This much may be shown 
both for scientific theory as a set of hypotheses and for scientific theory 
as a set of mathematical symbols, equations, or models. To model the 
movement of the Sun, traditional astronomy could propose either an 
eccentric circle or an epicycle, and each could be modeled 
mathematically.108 Modern astronomy, of course, has come to model 
the Sun as a point around which the Earth rotates along an elliptical 
orbit. Other variations on these hypotheses are undoubtedly possible—
Duhem noted the possibility of infinite hypotheses to explain a 
phenomenon, where the choice among hypotheses was a mere question 
of metaphysics and not pure science. If one wishes to hew to a mostly 
disfavored view of geocentrism, one has the eccentric and epicycle 
theories as choices. If one wishes to adopt the philosophical stance of 
Galileo, one may adopt the elliptical model. If one wishes to be more 
creative, any number of other choices are available. In the space of 
hypotheses, there is evidently the possibility of adequate choice for at 
least some scientific theories —Duhem’s use of the word “infinite” is 
telling in this respect. Further, the scientist is free to choose among the 
universe of possible hypotheses using the sort of personal (or 
metaphysical) judgment that characterizes a finding of creativity in 
previous court decisions.  
Exactly the same may be said of the specific models and equations 
that make up a scientific theory. Newton was free to propose an 
equation that based gravity on the reciprocal of the square of the 
distance between two objects (among other things), and that did not 
preclude Einstein from developing a theory of relativity that very 
differently models gravity via his field equations. Any number of 
mathematical representations for a given theory are possible, not just 
as between different theories in the Newtonian and Einsteinian cases, 
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but within a single theoretical framework. Mathematics is generally a 
pliable enough field that many different equations can be relied upon 
to achieve effectively the same set of results. Although they were 
ultimately rejected, eccentrics and epicycles did a reasonable job of 
predicting the movement of various celestial bodies, and those two 
could be used in some respects as a near one-to-one replacement for a 
set of calculations based on the elliptical orbits of the planets of the 
Solar System. This sort of mathematical openness and 
interchangeability, which pervades any number of domains beyond 
simple mechanics, speaks to the possible presence of sufficient 
alternatives for a finding of copyrightable creativity in the selection of 
one particular set of mathematical equations or models for a given 
theory. Further, as the scientist selecting such mathematical symbolism 
for a theory will often have exercised more than a “garden-variety” 
amount of judgment,109 the second prong of the creativity test regularly 
applied by courts will equally be satisfied. Mathematical models in 
support of scientific theory should, in principle, be susceptible of the 
sort of creativity that merits copyright protection.   
Even where scientific theory most approaches reality—via the 
classification naturelle—it still is capable of evidencing creativity. 
Again, despite the purported perfection and elegance of a theory that 
achieves the rare reflection of the classification naturelle, that theory 
is still only an approximation of reality—it has not passed into the 
space of the real by virtue of its highly-predictive modeling. Yet might 
it be too close to reality to merit copyright protection? One might argue 
this point by noting that there are very few alternatives that embody the 
proposed scientific theory with such clarity, economy, or accuracy. For 
want of alternatives, copyright should be hesitant to grant an overbroad 
monopoly on a theory that is both necessary to other researchers and 
hard to replace. This argument may be answered by noting that this 
leads to the somewhat perverse outcome that the scientists generating 
the most elegant theories would fail to receive copyright protection 
while lesser scientific theories are rewarded for their inaccuracies and 
lack of economy. The argument is doubly persuasive in view of 
Duhem’s belief that theories that reflect the classification naturelle are 
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sources of the highest form of aesthetic beauty in science. Aesthetic 
beauty and artistry are precisely what copyright has always sought to 
protect—there is no reason the most aesthetically-pleasing books and 
paintings should be eligible for copyright protection while the 
embodiment of the most beautiful scientific theories is not (and 
certainly not if we are willing to accord copyrightability to other 
theories).    
Affording copyrightability to scientific theory would not 
necessarily run afoul of copyright’s bedrock principle—the utilitarian 
theory of copyright. The utilitarian theory operates on a premise of 
exchange—by granting artists, musicians, authors, and other creators 
certain economic incentives in their work, those creators will be more 
likely to create and circulate their work.110 This exchange requires a 
certain balance to be struck in the incentives and goods to be 
exchanged, lest one side unduly profit at the other’s expense. If, for 
example, a copyright protected no more than the exact words in a book 
or the exact notes in an entire song, then would-be infringers could get 
off with strictly de minimis changes to an original work, and the 
economic incentives to create would suffer. If, on the other hand, a 
copyright protected a work so thoroughly as to cover the very general 
idea of the work, fundamental ideas necessary for future works would 
be monopolized by the first person to embody them in any work at all, 
and society would suffer for lack of both non-infringing protected 
works and an ample public domain. Fortunately, copyright law mostly 
avoids these obvious pitfalls (and others less obvious) by maintaining 
a dichotomy, mentioned above, between unprotectable “infrastructure” 
and protectable “application.” Professor Peter Lee defines 
unprotectable infrastructure according to three criteria:  
(1) the resource is at least partially nonrival;  
(2) it derives its primary social value from facilitating 
downstream productive activity; and  
(3) it serves as an input into a wide range of goods and 
services, including private, public, and nonmarket goods. 
Extended to intellectual property, intangible resources 
satisfying these criteria qualify as intellectual 
infrastructure.111  
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By way of clarification, the first factor turns on the resource not being 
diminished by additional use;112 the second views the resource as more 
of a means of communication than an end in itself; and the third, of 
course, speaks to the need for subsequent reuse of the resource.113 It 
makes perfect sense that words or general ideas would be considered 
infrastructure according to this definition, as each serves as a means to 
support endlessly growing downstream production. 
Although natural laws end up lumped in with words and ideas,114 
it is less clear why such laws, at least embodied in the form of scientific 
theory, should necessarily qualify as infrastructure. While scientific 
theory may lead to a variety of downstream creation—both educational 
and applied, that does not mean that scientific theory does not serve as 
an end in and of itself. Scientific theory is a human construction to 
improve understanding of natural phenomena and perhaps even to bend 
reality to the theoretical construction, if Gaston Bachelard’s view of 
relativity is to be believed.115 Such a construction can both be created 
and stand on its own, without any further application. That is science 
in its purest form—that someone might come along to profit from it by 
applying it downstream seems all the more reason to protect scientific 
theory against such exploitation. In some respects, the infrastructure 
construction may be an ill fit in this particular case.                
In others, though, infrastructure’s division may be a good fit in 
support of the protection of scientific theory. Copyright law’s 
preservation of necessary infrastructure relies on two key limits in 
copyright’s scope—fair use and merger—that makes it a good 
candidate to protect scientific theory without overprotecting scientific 
theory.  
Fair use, defined generally if wordily, is an exception to 
infringement where a party that has no rights to a copyrighted work 
may under certain circumstances exercise protected rights in that work 
without a license from the work’s owner.116 The exception is based on 
the understanding the intellectual progress often means that current 
work must be based in part on prior work and must be able to access, 
retransmit, and transform such work. Parodists need to be able to use 
the original work that they parody to a certain extent.117 Academic 
commentators need to be able to quote the original works on which 
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they comment. Teachers need to be able to instruct their students in 
reliance on original works, not paraphrases contrived to attempt to 
avoid infringement. Fair use exists to allow such practices and others 
like it.  
The doctrine, which draws its origin in the common law,118 but 
has since been codified in statutory form,119 defines the circumstances 
where a use will be deemed “fair” based on a four-factor balancing test. 
The four factors to be considered are: (1) the purpose and character of 
the use, including whether it transforms the original, or is for 
educational, academic, or non-commercial purposes, (2) the nature of 
the original copyrighted work—that is, whether it is more or less 
creative, (3) the amount of the original work used, both qualitatively 
and quantitatively, and (4) the effect that the use will have on the 
market for the original work.120 Either the great attribute or the great 
fault of fair use—depending on one’s view—is that it allows for no 
bright-line rules; but the statutory factors and case law do provide 
certain high-level data points. Uses are likely to be found fair if they 
tend to: (1) be more transformative of the original,121 (2) borrow from 
a more functional or dry source,122 (3) use less than all of the original 
work, including avoiding using the heart of the work,123 and (4) have 
little or no impact on the market of the original.124 As the test is based 
on a weighing of factors, however, a use does not need to “win” on all 
four factors to be found fair.  
Even in view of this high-level background, it is easy to imagine 
how fair use would accommodate the use of a protected set of scientific 
models, equations, or hypotheses in certain key cases. The most typical 
examples would involve the use of the theory in an academic or 
scholarly setting—as fodder for a conference talk, a journal article, or 
a textbook. In each of these cases, the argument for fair use will often 
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be compelling. Most critically, under the first factor, the use would be 
non-commercial in many cases, as the conference talk or article may 
not involve direct compensation. The uses would be academic, a type 
of use explicitly mentioned in the statute as favoring a finding of fair 
use. Finally, the uses would be very likely to be transformative, for 
even if the entire equation or model was reproduced, it would be within 
a larger work that altered the theory’s context by critiquing it, 
classifying, or explaining it along with other scientific theories. In other 
words, later scientific users would be likely to be producing new and 
valuable material based on the original equation rather than simply 
exploiting it as a source of misappropriated gain.125 Meanwhile, 
commercial users relying on an entire theory for commercial gain 
would be less likely to be deemed non-infringing due to fair use. Those 
users would by definition be commercial in nature; they would be 
taking the entirety of a work; and they would be operating in a 
derivative market that the theorist might have leveraged for 
commercial gain. If fair use were to work this way for scientific 
theory—by excusing the academic user while demanding license fees 
of the commercial user—it would seem to be serving its core aim, the 
promotion of a wholly equitable result.       
The merger doctrine would serve a similar end by eliminating 
copyright protection entirely for certain scientific theories. As the word 
“merger” suggests, merger doctrine applies when a work’s idea and its 
expression are deemed to merge—in other words, when an idea admits 
of so few different alternative forms of expression that the idea and the 
expression are effectively one and the same. In such cases, a work is 
not eligible for copyright protection. Examples of merger have 
occurred in cases involving a map of a pipeline route,126 a set of box-
top instructions,127 and a building code subsequently adopted as law in 
a Texas town.128 These cases share a very limited space in which the 
idea may operate. Once a pipeline route has been selected, its map 
follows as a matter of course. Box-top instructions to make a purchaser 
aware of a contest or a rebate tend to be fairly sparse and strictly 
informational. A building code, once adopted into law, has transformed 
into an inflexible, uncopyrighted artifact. One can imagine a scientific 
theory that would offer a similar lack of openness, due to the simplicity 
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of both the theory’s idea and the phenomenon modeled, and the lack of 
alternative means of constructing an equivalent theory. Where 
Duhem’s proposed openness finds a real-life counterexample, 
copyright will not honor that theory with its protection—perhaps all the 
more reason to trust Duhem’s theory in the first place. Either way, 
between fair use and the merger doctrine, copyright offers two key 
means for protecting a robust public domain, even if scientific theory 
were to become copyrightable.  
We might close this argument with an evocation of an image 
offered by the French academician Michel Serres. His book Le Parasite 
is—consistent with most of his work—a meditation on information 
theory and on information’s susceptibility to error in transit, its decay 
in time, amid the overarching chaos of pure noise.129 Information is not 
just the message traveling on an electrical wire or other network, 
however; information is any arrangement that breaks from the chaotic 
equilibrium, be it a machine, a living organism, or an unusual 
concentration of gas particles. It is the Lucretian clinamen rippling 
turbulently amid a field of unidirectional, laminar flow. In all things, 
both order and chaos, information and noise are capable of co-existing 
and interacting in an ever-evolving cycle. So, when Serres speaks of 
treating a certain arrangement of atoms (like a human body) as a 
“system,” he highlights the side of the system often neglected. Where 
most see the system as a site of overarching order, Serres is quick to 
recall that this externally-constructed (and externally-projecting) 
information retains an internal double of noise and chaos that continue 
to exist within the system despite its apparent containment. For 
example, in the system tracking the interaction between oxygen and the 
human body, one is quick to recall that oxygen is a beneficial source of 
heat yet quick to forget that oxygen is also a part of the oxidation 
process that is aging.130 The system is a black box that simultaneously 
reveals a certain amount of information about the relations selected all 
while interposing an opaque barrier between the observer and the 
chaotic or deviant behavior that remains within the system.131  
In its latter ignorance, the system is not knowledge, but “non-
knowledge.”132 Serres views knowledge as a bridge between pure 
chaos and system.133 If this be the case, then knowledge is a form of 
transit, of transformation, that can only meaningfully generate 
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understanding through the creation of systems. Science and scientific 
theory clearly merit this treatment. What this suggests is still another 
dimension of indeterminacy in the creation of scientific theory.  
Where to this point in the Article Duhem’s philosophy has 
highlighted the fundamental openness in translation between observed 
phenomenon and the resulting scientific model or theory, Serres would 
add that indeterminacy also exists within the model or theory finally 
proposed. By selecting a certain set of conditions and mathematical 
symbols, certain behaviors in a system may be modeled well, but there 
ever remains a fringe within the system which does not align with a 
model’s predictions, that remains unpredictable and unknown. This 
additional space of indeterminacy, of Brownian motion, of chaos 
serves as a reminder that scientific theory is never complete and never 
completed. It is instead an ever-open and ever-evolving set of 
constructs that require as much creativity fed into the choice of a 
system and its parameters as it requires pure factual observation and 
tabulation. Irreducible movement and creativity is the hallmark of what 
copyright law protects. Accordingly, copyright law should be open to 
protecting scientific theories.  
II.  AN ARGUMENT NOT TO PROTECT SCIENTIFIC THEORY UNDER 
COPYRIGHT LAW 
The distinction between rationalism and realism is an equally 
good starting point for an argument against the copyrightability of 
scientific theories. To justify potential protection for scientific theory, 
recourse to a rationalist point of view is necessary, as realism could not 
possibly accommodate protection. If the equations and models of 
scientific theory are in fact reality, then granting copyright in such 
works would be tantamount to granting legal control over reality. That 
would quite obviously run afoul of the section 102(b) prohibitions on 
copyright protection—that copyright does not protect any “idea, 
procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or 
discovery.”134 Scientific theory as reality would be relegated to simple 
principle tethered to natural phenomena, mere discovery of pre-
existing reality, stripped of any Latourian inversion.135  
Beyond the language of section 102(b), the policy motivating it—
the utilitarian theory of copyright protection—would suffice to show 
that a realist construction of scientific theory would not provide the 
basis for any copyright protection in scientific theories. It may be 
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recalled that the utilitarian theory aims to strike a balance in protection 
such that creators retain sufficient economic incentives to create 
without giving such creators too much protection in the interest of 
preserving a rich public domain for subsequent creators. Granting 
copyright in reality is a form of clear overprotection, where copyright’s 
comfort zone shielding specific words on a page or bits on a drive 
morphs into an uncomfortable protection of the very phenomena that 
happen in the perceived universe. We would effectively be back in the 
reductio ad absurdum case where intellectual property in Newton’s 
gravitational equations would allow a modern Newton to exact 
royalties for activities like sitting in a chair or jumping up and down. 
That would represent an unacceptable level of economic control for a 
creator at the expense of the public domain.  
Yet arguments against the copyrightability of scientific theories 
do not require espousing a realist perspective—the protection of 
theories need not be any more palatable under a rationalist view. 
Because the rationalist argument in favor of copyright protection for 
scientific theory is already well-established, the rationalist argument 
against protection of scientific theory will require a bit more 
development. First, it will be necessary to flesh out certain important 
details of Duhem’s philosophy of science that were critically left 
underarticulated in the first part. For all of the seeming equivalence that 
Duhem viewed as built into scientific theory in both hypotheses and 
mathematical models, he was also aware of—if occasionally somewhat 
refractory to—science’s tendency to advance better and better models. 
Thereafter, it will be necessary to move beyond Duhem’s thought by 
demonstrating certain ways in which his philosophy of science is 
arguably inadequate to capture the movement of science, even as a 
rationalist endeavor. This will require a certain degree of reliance on 
Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.136 Lest this move seem 
to violate an unspoken rule of argument here, it should be noted that 
critics have seen Duhem’s work as thoroughly anticipating Kuhn’s by 
fifty or so years.137   
To present Duhem’s philosophy as it was in the first part of this 
Article is to depict the great edifice of scientific theory as a completely 
relative, interchangeable, and open construction. Any scientific theory 
is potentially open to being expressed—either as a hypothesis or as a 
mathematical model—in the form of infinite unexpressed alternatives. 
If each potential theory were a node in a great network, scientists could 
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pass from one equivalent node to the next without loss in predictive 
precision. Any scientist unhappy with the node that current science 
favored could simply shift to an adjacent equivalent and continue to 
produce good results. To add a temporal dimension to this, science 
would also be able to jump without substantial loss of precision 
between theories propounded at very different times. Take, for 
example, the difference between Ptolemaic epicycles, post-Galilean 
ellipses, and the more complicated motion of Einsteinian relativity 
when modeling the movement of the planets around the Sun. In its most 
open form, Duhem’s theory would seem to view these, and an infinite 
number of mathematical alternatives, as effectively equivalent ways of 
modeling the same thing.138 Science is in this respect wholly 
reversible, able to pass seamlessly between different theories, both 
forwards and backwards in time. Science couched in these terms is 
Newtonian, for Newton’s equations yield the same results without 
regard to the direction of the time vector. Anything that has been done 
under Newton’s laws can be undone and redone infinitely.139 To 
support copyright in scientific theory, one must favor this open 
temporality which, in turn, leads to infinite generativity in the realm of 
possible scientific theories. And if infinite equivalent models are 
possible, then no scientific creator risks accruing a problematic 
monopoly over intellectual property infrastructure. On the contrary, all 
scientific theory could safely be viewed as a form of protectable 
intellectual property application.  
This is not even how scientific theory works within Duhem’s 
philosophy, however. The freedom to express alternatives in any 
number of ways is automatically trimmed according to two critical 
criteria—economy of thought and the temporally-bound, accretive 
movement of science via the classification naturelle. Economy of 
thought as key in the creation and perpetuation of scientific theories—
an idea often associated with the scientists Ernst Mach140 and Henri 
Poincaré—speaks to a successful theory’s lapidary way of distilling 
incredible complexity to a manageable and memorable snapshot.141 
One can easily be overwhelmed imagining the disparate number, type, 
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size, and shape of mechanical bodies governed at least generally by 
Newton’s gravitational and force equations. Newton’s equations allow 
much of this variety to be treated as mere noise, while focusing on 
critical variables like the mass of the objects in question and their 
distance apart. With these critical data points in tow, meaningful 
calculations are possible via a few easily-recalled equations. If a variety 
of other mathematical equations might approximately achieve the same 
numerical results as Newton’s equations, basically every such equation 
would be more difficult to remember and use than its Newtonian 
analogues. The same could be said of other similarly economical 
formulae, like Snell’s Law to measure the refraction of light, Einstein’s 
relation between mass, energy and the speed of light (E = mc2), and the 
ideal gas law.  
The classification naturelle exerts a dual limitation on the 
possible existence of alternative means of expressing a scientific 
theory. One such limitation is temporally based; the other is linked to 
predictive precision. The two limitations generally evolve in tandem, 
however, where change in theory over time is closely linked to 
improvement in theory’s predictive results.142 Because of the improved 
precision of theories that merit the designation of a classification 
naturelle, science is ever undergoing an accretive, unidirectional 
process of improvement where theories provide closer and closer 
predictions of the behavior of natural phenomena.143  
Duhem provides an analogy for precisely the tension at issue 
here—the observer of the ocean’s waves from the shore.144 Such an 
observer will very clearly see the seemingly haphazard struggle of one 
wave crashing into another, or a set of waves pulling back into the 
ocean as another pushes its crest shoreward. Yet beneath the stochastic 
noise and seeming lack of progress of these movements, there is a 
guided movement, that of the tide coming in or going out. The 
proponent of copyright protection in scientific theory would ask to see 
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See generally LEE SMOLIN, THE TROUBLE WITH PHYSICS (Mariner Books 2007) (2006). 
 143. There is a reason that one of Duhem’s books contains the word evolution in its title. In 
that case, Duhem speaks of the evolution of mechanics. Mechanics in Duhem’s time, he proclaims 
in the final paragraph of his book, was a corollary to mechanics reaching back to ancient Greece 
and would undoubtedly serve as a corollary for future development in the field. DUHEM, supra 
note 41, at 188-89.  
 144. DUHEM, LA THÉORIE PHYSIQUE, supra note 43, at 38-39. 
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only the frothy turbulence of scientific movements crashing into each 
other chaotically, without guided movement. All waves are more or 
less equal, that proponent suggests, and can be swapped in and out of 
human conception with little or no loss. That proponent misses the 
ocean’s movement for the waves (and the forest for the trees, of 
course), as science pursues a process that is often as much irreversible 
as it is reversible.  
To take the three examples provided above, one cannot seamlessly 
slip between Ptolemaic, Galilean, and Einsteinian theoretical systems. 
Ptolemy’s epicycles may have developed mathematically accurate 
predictions as to the locations of planets and stars, but it relies on a 
geocentric construction belied by later models. Galilean ellipses may 
remedy the geocentric flaw, but even they do not adequately predict the 
progression of Mercury’s perihelion—only Einstein’s theory does 
that.145 As scientific theory gets more and more accurate in time, new 
phenomena fall within its purview, all while long-studied phenomena 
become better and better understood. Scientific theorists cannot simply 
move from theory at one point in time to another and expect equally 
good results.146     
This series of constraints on the interchangeability of scientific 
theory within the philosophy of Duhem has an analogue in current 
copyright jurisprudence—the treatment of computer software as 
copyrightable. The analogue is not completely surprising—just as one 
court has noted that software combines elements of creative and 
technical expression in one work,147 so too does scientific theory 
capture the creativity and inventiveness of the scientist alongside the 
technical requirements of empirical and mathematical precision.  
																																								 																				
 145. See EINSTEIN, supra note 12, at 117-18. 
 146. See Burk, supra note 17, at 308 (“Much of the social mechanism of science is devoted 
to regulating the acquisition, dissemination, and interpretation of empirical data. Empirical truth 
forms the foundation of the scientific edifice, and each participant in the scientific enterprise 
builds upon the work done by previous participants. In order to participate, the scientist must be 
aware of previous work and in turn, make his work known to others. Consequently, in order to 
advance the state of science, and to avoid unnecessary duplication of effort, the system must 
encourage scientists to share their results with one another. As a result, the scientific community 
consists of a cooperative structure within which empirical data may be freely shared.” (footnotes 
omitted)). See also Goldberg, supra note 14, at 1342 (“[S]cience appears unambiguously to make 
progress. It may be a truism to say that scientists today know more than scientists in the past, but 
it is a truism with important implications. An assistant professor of biology today may know more 
about evolution than Darwin. That does not mean the professor is brighter than Darwin, but only 
that she stands on Darwin's shoulders and on the shoulders of many other scientists. Because 
science is in this sense cumulative, it is possible to say that a particular scientist has made an 
important contribution.”). 
 147. Comput. Assoc. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 704 (2d Cir. 1992). 
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In the space of software copyright cases involving a claim of 
infringement, courts often rely on the three-step abstraction-filtration-
comparison test originally proposed by the Second Circuit in Computer 
Associates International, Inc. v. Altai, Inc.148 The first two steps of the 
test involve the identification of aspects of an original piece of software 
code that is not copyrightable due to a variety of factors, and the 
subsequent removal of such unprotectable aspects from the ultimate 
infringement comparison. Items that the Second Circuit deemed 
appropriate for such filtration included software elements dictated by 
efficiency considerations,149 software elements dictated by external 
factors (like programming language- or interoperability-related 
constraints),150 and elements already in the public domain.151 In the 
realm of scientific theory under Duhem’s philosophy, similar 
abstraction and filtration steps would yield the removal of elements of 
a theory dictated by: (1) a desire to achieve an economy of thought in 
formulation, (2) a better capacity to model and predict actual 
phenomena compared to previous scientific models and theories, (3) 
high-level, unprotectable ideas (i.e., that “objects are attracted to one 
another”), and (4) elements of the theory dictated by the advance of 
science, including elements of prior science that have fallen into (or 
have always been in) the public domain. In view of these constraints, 
what once looked like a field ripe for copyright protection in Part II 
now would seem to offer almost no possibility for copyright protection 
at all.       
The creator of a traditional aesthetic work and the modern-day 
scientist face very different decision trees when undertaking their 
work, and thus the creator and scientist should face very different legal 
protection systems in the result of that work. For an author, sculptor, 
painter, or other aesthetically-motivated creator, there remains 
tremendous freedom to generate work based on any source of 
inspiration. An author can jump back in time to Homer for poetic 
structure, take a cue from Nabokov or Dickens when writing a novel, 
or write a play based on the ideas of Ibsen, Shakespeare, or Tennessee 
Williams. Artists can similarly draw guidance from a Turner, Monet, 
or Seurat in visual art. Or perhaps the author or artist wants to follow a 
new direction and found a school that would be the new Dadaism or 
Cubism or any other -ism. Even the Roman Expérimental project 
																																								 																				
 148. Id. at 706.  
 149. Id. at 707-09. 
 150. Id. at 709-10. 
 151. Id. at 710. 
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proposed by Zola,152 where a novel’s events were allegedly the result 
of a scientifically-determined sequence of events, is not to be taken 
particularly seriously. The idea of that project was much more an 
answer to Zola’s critics (who did not like what they perceived as vulgar 
content in his books) than it was an actual description of how any novel 
comes together. There remains a substantial margin of freedom in the 
creation of any aesthetically-motivated work, where time and space can 
bend, and the rules of a school of thought or a view of the universe can 
be bent, broken, repurposed, or reinvented.   
In comparison with the artist or author, much less is possible for 
the typical scientist, who must work within an established framework 
that applies constraints in a variety of dimensions. One is what Gaston 
Bachelard calls the phénomènotechnique,153 the set of technological 
preconditions assumed by a science at a given time. The theory 
governing many modern phenomena does not only depend on modern 
tools like a mass spectrometer; it is entirely constituted by such 
tools.154 With each complicated tool which modern science requires, a 
host of assumptions must be made about the reliability of such tools 
and the theories that went into their construction. Scientists also are 
generally required to remain up-to-date in the current state of their field 
(to avoid duplicative results, to promote new work, etc.).155 By doing 
that, however, scientists are buying into a great theoretical construct 
that may draw on numerous mathematical and scientific disciplines, 
and centuries of slow development, much of which is taken as assumed. 
An astronomer may have a lot of freedoms, but among them are not the 
ability to re-invent calculus or re-adopt Ptolemy. The overarching 
takeaway may be a bit over-generalized and over-simplified, but it is 
safe to say that traditional aesthetic artists are free to work in their own 
specific clinamen-informed ripples while scientists must pay much 
more attention to their domain’s overarching tide.      
Before re-emphasizing this point in a final argument that owes 
much to Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, a few points 
of copyright policy bear mention here in their lack of support for the 
protectability of scientific theory. While it is true that copyright 
																																								 																				
 152. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.  
 153. See generally BACHELARD, supra note 53 (discussing the concept of 
phénomènotechnique); see also LATOUR & WOOLGAR, supra note 54, at 63-64, 238 (revisiting 
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 154. LATOUR & WOOLGAR, supra note 54, at 59. 
 155. See sources cited supra note 140 and accompanying text; see also Rai, supra note 5, at 
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protects dryer content—the examples of used car prices, statistical 
forms, and computer software have been given156—these are areas 
where copyright struggles mightily to find its bearings. Take, for 
example, the area of parts numbers or other basic numerical sequences, 
which some litigants have proposed to be worthy of copyright 
protection.157 Courts have consistently struggled in such cases to 
determine a workable definition of both the idea and the expression 
involved in the assignment or creation of such numbers.  
Southco, Inc. v. Kanebridge Corp. is a good example of this, 
where the majority found that a parts numbering system did not merit 
copyright protection. The system itself was a set of short codes that 
indexed different characteristics of rivets, latches, and similar pieces of 
hardware, where the codes could be combined serially to describe a 
given part.158 The majority dismissed the possibility that such codes 
could be protected, as the creation of the initial codes reflected a mere 
unprotectable “idea” or “system,” and that the subsequent application 
of the system to specific parts was a wholly uncreative exercise.159 The 
dissent in Southco disagreed with the majority’s characterization of the 
specific code numbering system at issue as an uncopyrightable idea.160 
The dissent instead viewed the concept of code numbering systems in 
general as the idea and the specific system selected by the plaintiff as 
an expression of that idea.161  
The reality is, neither the majority nor the dissent is 
overwhelmingly persuasive in Southco, but that is not their fault. They 
are deciding a case in a space where the unprotectable “idea” has only 
two possible forms—“the idea of creating a parts numbering system” 
or “the idea of creating the specific parts numbering system at issue 
here.” The protectable expression, meanwhile, is even harder to 
discern, as the application of numbers to parts does not involve any 
meaningful, articulable aesthetic choice. On one hand, a court could 
find such parts numbers protectable in their very specific articulation 
and not worry too much as other such systems would be available to 
others (as did the dissent), or it could determine that there is no 
expressive content at any level in the system (as did the majority).  
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It is easy to imagine similarly difficult questions arising in a space 
where scientific theory in its purest form of equations and models is 
believed to be potentially eligible for copyright. The equations and 
models would be as dry and functional as any set of parts numbers, and 
they would be motivated by a clear, functional idea underlying the 
specific equation chosen. Courts would be left wondering what about 
that specific equation or model is expressive in a way that is not 
thoroughly dictated by the underlying idea and other constraints 
already discussed here.  
Courts would face an additional issue presented by the Southco 
case and other functional works eligible for copyright—the paradoxical 
incentive to provide the greatest protection for that which should be 
least copyrightable due to its functionality. Likely the most valuable 
element of the Southco numbering system was its ability to 
communicate characteristics about a part based on a number. Yet this 
communicative ability followed foremost from a dry or rote application 
of pre-established codes to existing parts. In other words, the system’s 
point of value is precisely its least creative, most functional feature. 
The same could be said of copyright in software, where software’s real 
value is its ability to do something successfully in a computer system 
and not its reliance on fanciful code that does not perform well or 
efficiently. One would correctly assume that it is the latter that should 
be most eligible for copyright protection, while the former 
functionality should remain unprotected under section 102(b). The 
same logic would apply to scientific theory, where copyright would 
seem most adequate to protect parts of a model or theory that do not 
represent reality well, while the most accurate portions would work a 
merger between the equation, on one hand, and the observed 
phenomena or underlying scientific idea, on the other. The 
classification naturelle may have been beautiful to Duhem, but its 
beauty derives from the perfection of its functionality, its predictive 
precision—the very aspect of the theory that should not merit copyright 
protection.    
The question of infringement by later theorists in the same 
scientific space would present its own unusual challenges. What sort of 
equation or theory that leads to the same results could be found 
infringing? It could be just the original equation or theory, such that all 
alternative articulation of the original’s terms avoids a finding of 
infringement. Such would be a presumption of a very thin copyright in 
a theory. Or perhaps courts might figure out a way to determine 
infringing alternatives from non-infringing ones. Yet how could that 
distinction be made plausibly? In the space of copyrightable works 
relying on written language like articles and books, there is some ability 
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to distinguish between a non-infringing second work and a second 
work that merely illicitly paraphrases the original (even if that work 
does not go so far as exact copying). In mathematical symbolism, it is 
much less clear what paraphrasing might mean. It could mean 
anything from—(1) two equations that lead to effectively the same 
results, to (2) two equations that use a certain percentage of the same 
functions, to (3) two equations that rely on similar mathematical 
theories, to (4) two equations that are the same but for de minimis 
changes. Any of these choices would seem defensible, but would lead 
to very different, and potentially very hard-to-administer, legal rules.  
It is not at all clear that wading into these murky waters offers all 
that much benefit. As already mentioned, the community of theoretical 
scientists currently enjoys its own system of rewards, privileges, and 
incentives largely outside of the domain of copyright protections. 
Further, commentators have often observed institutional science’s 
aversion to the insertion of legal rigors in their practices.162 There 
seems little necessity to alter incentives in a system that is currently 
functioning, particularly where the creation of additional incentives 
would bring along a host of new legal complexities that would be very 
costly to figure out and manage. Only re-enforcing this point is the 
intellectual property infrastructure argument—because scientific 
theory is often needed for use in a range of downstream goods and 
services, it fits more appropriately in the space of unprotected 
infrastructure than in that of protectable application. When a system 
functions reasonably well, as here, perhaps the best approach is to let 
it continue and keep the more drastic changes for a different situation.    
As a final point, Thomas Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific 
Revolutions provides a reminder that some of the relativizing views of 
Duhem or Latour do not have as much currency in a domain of legal 
analysis. Latour, it may be recalled, focuses his sociological studies 
broadly, on both the vainqueurs and the vaincus,163 the winners and the 
losers in a given scientific domain investigated. Duhem, for his part, 
was unfortunate enough to be on the losing team, as his commitment 
to energetics would ultimately prove misguided due to the rise of 
atomic theory. When approaching the study of science from a 
																																								 																				
 162. See Burk, supra note 17, at 320 (Legal procedures “do not necessarily reflect the values 
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perspective of the vaincus, one is more inclined to see the relative 
merits of competing theories and avoid completely rejecting plausible 
theories due to the sole influence of social forces. Science has not, 
however, developed solely due to social factors, and not all theories 
that were once held in esteem should be viewed as more or less 
equivalent to currently influential theories (though by no means should 
rejected theories be slighted entirely in a glorification of those who 
ultimately won).  
The theory of relativity—ironically enough—stands as an 
exemplary obstacle to an ideal that relativizes a range of scientific 
theories. To understand this, awareness of the rise of non-Euclidean 
geometry is of some importance, as that framework broke with 
centuries of belief that Euclid’s straight line- and plane-based geometry 
was the only way to do such mathematics. With non-Euclidean 
geometry, another system seemed to perform just as well, even if based 
on parabolas or hyperbolas instead of lines. What seems like a 
justification for a more relativized view of mathematics—a world with 
multiple equivalent systems of geometry—breaks down with relativity 
because the  general theory of relativity does not work in Euclidean 
geometry.164 Not all systems are equally good for all calculations; not 
all theories should be given equal weight. Relativity pushed out 
Newtonian mechanics to a certain extent; and someday another theory 
will come along to supplement or replace relativity.   
This leaves science in a state of Kuhnian evolution. As Kuhn 
noted, the institution of science operating within an established 
framework (or paradigm) mostly relies on that paradigm to generate 
problems of normal science—puzzles that practitioners will attempt to 
solve to explore the bounds of the current paradigm.165 Other 
paradigms are generally excluded at this phase of normal, gradual 
scientific development as the scientific community ossifies its practices 
(if only temporarily) around the current paradigm by developing 
specialized equipment and vocabulary to incorporate the paradigm.166 
During these periods, science cannot be treated as purely relative, a sea 
of alternatives where each scientist may choose one without risking 
copying another. Far from it – scientists must be able to use the exact 
methods and theories of the current paradigm to participate in their 
community.  
In time, however, each paradigm runs its course. As new results 
or anomalous findings contradict its teachings and expectations, the 
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theory will cease to be able to respond adequately to the demands 
placed on it, and the science of the field will pass through a period of 
crisis.167 A new paradigm will be sought to rectify the current 
paradigm’s shortcomings. This is the famous Kuhnian paradigm 
shift,168 where a whole new way of seeing the world scientifically 
effectively inverts a previously accepted set of interpretations.169 Even 
in this phase, there remains a crisis of difference that presupposes the 
prior paradigm as a baseline, before a new period can begin, in which 
the incoming paradigm drives normal science. At all times, what is 
accepted as a matter of current scientific theory needs to be available 
for use—either in the generation of work of normal, scientific puzzle-
solving or in the push to improve, and possibly overturn, the current 
paradigm in favor of a new one. Protecting such science by copyright 
law could impose substantial hurdles to the fundamental 
accomplishment of non-applied science’s task. 
CONCLUSION 
Under Kuhn’s theory governing the advancement of science, 
science can be said to evolve according to an almost Darwinian notion 
of time, where theories play the role of species in the theory of natural 
selection.170 Established theories are capable of occupying new spaces 
as their proponents solve new puzzles in normal practice, much in the 
way that a species favored by the environment might spread. Yet as 
environmental conditions change, established theories may become 
disfavored, first in limited areas where the theory’s principles lead to 
anomalous or inaccurate results and later when a more general crisis 
calls for a better theory entirely. According to this process, new 
theories arise in competition with established theories and can 
overcome such theories where they are unable to compete for lack of a 
flexible response to the scientific environment. When replaced, as in 
the case of ether or phlogiston, a scientific theory may even pass from 
hegemony to eventual extinction, as better adapted theories continue to 
propel science’s slow forward movement. Science evolving according 
to Kuhn’s theory follows a movement that is directed and historically 
dependent. This view stands in stark contrast to the concept of science, 
proposed earlier here, as a truly relative, atemporal, Newtonian 
construction in time.  
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Science’s movement retains elements of each of these types of 
time, of course. The measures of laminar movement pushing the tide to 
shore, and the current theories to perfection or replacement are matched 
by ripples and turbulence that are far more relative and free in their 
movements. For the guided Darwinian movement of science, copyright 
protection is a decidedly poor fit.171 Current scientists need free access 
to prevailing theories to improve that theory or propose paradigm-
shifting alternatives, just as future scientists will need to access new 
paradigms in their work.172 In this highly-contingent environment, it is 
not entirely clear that copyright law would even know what to protect 
within the models and equations of a theory, in terms of separating 
expression from underlying idea, process, or principle. Yet science’s 
turbulent movements may come with greater freedom for the scientist 
in a specific moment in time, a set of equally-palatable alternatives rich 
enough in variation to merit copyright protection. And one should not 
forget that no matter how accurate a theory becomes, it remains 
reasonably conceived of as a rationalist construction reflecting 
scientific creativity, as opposed to a dry set of uncopyrightable facts.   
For now, the system denying most forms of intellectual property 
protection seems to work well enough. Science continues to advance 
through its own funding channels173 and with its own set of non-legal 
incentives.174 Yet, if Duhem’s theories taught us nothing, it is that 
science could—under some circumstances—be an appropriate target 
for protection by copyright law.175 For the moment, the hypothesis 
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proposed here should at least remain open to future consideration, even 
if it would best remain rejected for the time being. Perhaps it need 
merely await a future paradigm shift in the culture of science. 
 
																																								 																				
have to be asked to play a greater role in soliciting creativity.”).  
